AIR 1978 Supreme Court, 179, Gurucharan Singh and Ors. v. State (Delhi Admn.) wherein it was held -
"Section 439(1), on the other hand, confers special powers on the High Court or the Court of Session in respect of bail. Unlike under Section 437(1) there is no ban imposed under Section 439(1), against granting of bail by the High Court or the Court of Session to persons accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It is, however, legitimate to suppose that the High Court or the Court of Session will be approached by an accused only after he has failed before the Magistrate and after the investigation has progressed throwing light on the evidence and circumstances implicating the accused. Even so, the High Court or the Court of Session will have to exercise its judicial discretion in considering the question of granting of bail under Section 439(1). The overriding considerations in granting bail which are common both in the case of Section 437(1) and Section 439(1) are the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed; the position and the status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice; of repeating the offences of jeopardising his own life being faced with a grim prospect of possible conviction in the case; of tampering with witnesses; the history of the case as well as of its investigation and other relevant grounds which, in view of so many variable factors, cannot be exhaustively set out. The two paramount considerations, viz., likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and his tampering with prosecution evidence relate to ensuring a fair trial of the case in a Court of justice. It is essential that due and proper weight should be bestowed on these two factors apart from others."
In BHAGIRATHSINH JUDEJA v. STATE OF GUJARAT, the Supreme Court held as follows:
"In our opinion, the learned Judge appears to have misdirected himself while examining the question of directing cancellation of bail by interfering with a discretionary order made by the learned Sessions Judge. One could have appreciated the anxiety of the learned Judge of the High Court that in the circumstances found by him that the victim attacked was a social and political worker and therefore the accused should not be granted bail but we fail to appreciate how that circumstance should be considered so overriding as to permit interference with a discretionary order of the learned Sessions Judge granting bail. The High Court completely overlooked the fact that it was not for it to decide whether the bail should be granted but the application before it was for cancellation of the bail. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary ;for an order seeking cancellation of the bail. And the trend today is towards granting bail because it is now well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the power to grant bail is not to be exercised as if the punishment before trial is being imposed. The only material considerations in such a situation are whether the accused would be readily available for his trial and Whether he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with evidence. The order made by the High Court is conspicuous by its silence on these two relevant considerations. It is for these reasons that we consider in the interest of justice a compelling necessity to interefere with the order made by the High Court."
For the reasons given above, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that this application be allowed ordering to release the petitioner on bail on such terms as the Court feel just and reasonable.
(i) 1977 (1) Crl. L.J. 486, Sant Ram v. Kalicharan and Ors. in which the Supreme Court held as follows:
"The Court while granting bail under Section 439 cannot go into the details of evidence to find out whether the evidence will be sufficient in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, it being not a relevant consideration at this stage to ascertain the probability of improbability of the prosecution case terminating in the conviction of the accused or not. While deciding a bail application it is not desirable to dissect or pronounce on the evidence otherwise in resorting to such a procedure the Court would be exceeding the limits of its functions. The probability of the guilt or innocence of the accused-persons is not a relevant consideration while dealing with bail applications as the question to determine is whether the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge and not evidence establishing the guilt of the accused persons beyond a reasonable doubt. Case law reviewed."
(vi) In 1991 Crl.L.J., 1298, M.P. Ramesh and Ors. v. State of Karnataka this Court held as under:
"It is well settled by the law laid down by the Supreme Court that personal liberty deprived when bail is refused is too precious a value of our constitutional system recognised under Article 21, that the crucial power to negate it is a great trust and confidence to be exercised, not casually or cursorily but judicially, with great care and circumspection in accordance with the established principles of justice displaying a lively and serious concern of the consequences of the refusal of bail to the individual concerned and the community. The significance and sweep of Article 21 of the Constitution make the deprivation of liberty a matter of grave concern. The deprivation of liberty would be permissible only when the law authorising and sanctioning it is reasonable, even-handed and geared to the obtainment and accomplishment of the good of the community.
The above are some references under which murder case accused have been granted bail;
If your lawyer is demanding exorbitant charges for getting your husband enlarged on bail, you may change the lawyer
