1) under the provisions of section 20 of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code a civil suit can be instituted in a Civil Court claiming a relief which inconsistent with the order made by the Collector under section 20 within a period of one year from the date on which the order has been passed by the Collector and in case there is an appeal, within the period of one year from the date on which the Appellate Authority decides the appeal.

2) in your case land acquisition officer passed award and has declared it to be pvyt land and awarded compensation . for acquiring part of land for road widening purposes

3) the said order was not challenged and it attained finality .

4) after 40 years the said issue cannot be reopened as under article 112 of limitation act limitation for filing suits by govt is 30 years

AIR 1975 Madras 303 (The State of T.N. And another vs. P.Kanagamani and others) "18. Apart from the above considerations, the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 1500 referred to already clearly and categorically lays down the proposition that an award made by a Collector under Section 11 of the Act is not a decision and that it is only an offer made by him on behalf of the Government to the owner of the land. That decision will clearly lead to the inevitable conclusion that the award of the Collector made under Section 11 of the Act cannot be questioned by way of a petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India."

2) (1996) 11 SCC 501 (Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others) "24. In State of T.N. v. L. Krishnan8, a Bench of three Judges of this Court had held that the delay in challenging notification was fatal and the writ petitions were liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches.

3)It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226.

AIR 2000 SC 671 (Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and another vs. Shah Hyder Beig and others) "17. In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases (C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of T.N.2) this Court observed as below: (SCC p. 628, para 4) 4. The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the Act) in GOR No. 1392 Industries dated [deleted], total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in Tamil Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasina by Tvl. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30-4-1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership, was transferred in GOMs No. 816 Industries dated 24-3-1971 in favour of another subsidiary company. Shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., the 5th respondent which is also another subsidiary of the Company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in GOMs No. 439 Industries dated 10-5-1985. In GOMs No. 546 Industries dated 30-3-1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original GOMs No. 1392 Industries dated [deleted] contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of the compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed.

(xi) 2005 (3) CTC 1 (Ramalingam and others vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and others) "3. In these appeals, the facts are that the Award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act was given on 07.11.1996, whereas the writ petitions were filed on 28.11.1996, i.e. after the award was passed. It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that no writ petition should be entertained after the award under the Land Acquisition Act has been passed vide Tej Kaur and others vs. State of Punjab and others, 2003 (4) SCC 485; Municipal Council, Ahmed Nagar vs. Shah Hyder Beig, AIR 2000 SC 671; Executive Engineer, Jal Nigam Central Stores Division, Uttar Pradesh vs. Suresh Nand Jayal, 1997 (9) SCC 224; State of Tamil Nadu vs. L.Krishnan and others, 1996 (1) SCC 250. Following the aforesaid decision, we are of the opinion that the writ petition itself were not maintainable and they should have been dismissed on this ground itself. Hence, the writ appeals are dismissed. ..."